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In the Darkness of This Time: 




Both Wittgenstein and Freud experienced the crisis of humanism resulting from 
the first and second world wars. Although they were both considered to be influen-
tial figures, they hardly investigated the ways in which people could cope with the 
consequences of these crises. However, Wittgenstein and Freud did suggest ways of 
understanding uncertainties caused by real life events, as well as by the nature of 
human thought processes. This article will explore the therapeutic ways of dealing 
with uncertainties common to both thinkers and the different concepts facilitating 
their methodologies. The central contention of this article is that both Wittgenstein 
and Freud developed a complex methodology, acknowledging the constant and 
unexpected changes humans have deal with, whilst also offering the possibility 
of defining “hinge propositions” and “language-games” which can stabilize our 
consciousness.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, Freud, uncertainty, hinge propositions, chaos, complexity, 
defense-mechanism, uncanny
1. Introduction
The relevance of philosophical and psychanalytic thinking to existential 
problems.
“I make them public with misgivings. It is not impossible that it should fall to the 
lot of this work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into 
one brain or another a but, of course, it is not likely”[1].
In what ways can the years in which Freud and Wittgenstein lived, brighten the 
darkness of our own era? This chapter will examine Freud and Wittgenstein’s main 
ideas about feelings of certainty or uncertainty in everyday life and at times of crisis 
to learn from them how to cope with uncertainty. Freud and Wittgenstein lived in 
pluralistic Vienna at the beginning of the 20th century, sharing the same cultural 
climate, an era when a multidisciplinary approach to culture was blossoming.
Though Wittgenstein was younger than Freud he could not avoid relating to 
him [2]. Ostensibly, Freud and Wittgenstein were involved in different fields of 
knowledge. However, both thinkers experienced two world wars that led to personal 
crises for each of them alongside the general crises that afflicted Vienna as a con-
sequence of these wars (Although Freud died in 1939, he nonetheless experienced 
the consequences of the Nazi’s rise to power including the arrest of his daughter and 
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their escape to London in the dead of the night). Freud (1856–1939) the father of 
psychoanalysis, formulated the characteristics of the psyche’s development and the 
psychoanalytic technique that facilitates coping with pathologies in the function-
ing of the human psyche. Wittgenstein (1889–1951) commonly accepted as having 
been the progenitor of the Linguistic Turn, [3] stepped beyond the boundaries of 
philosophy, involved himself in the social sciences and humanities and proposed a 
set of tools to investigate the way in which language functions in various practices. 
According to Wittgenstein, the need for such an investigation existed due to illu-
sions and confusions that arise from a mistaken use of language [4].
Both thinkers dealt with a central question, namely: ‘What can be said to be 
the connections between man and his world as they come to be expressed and 
accessible to us in language’? Each of them dealt with this question from a differ-
ent perspective. Freud formulated the ‘Reality Principle’, [5] and Wittgenstein ‘the 
picture theory’ [6]. In both contexts. The external reality imposes on an individual 
the recognition of a situation which, at least in part, it is difficult for him to accept. 
This common position is an important starting point for the purpose of this article 
which also deals with coping with the reality of Covid 19 imposed on humanity and 
has created – among other things – an existential feeling of uncertainty.
The intellectual closeness between Freud and Wittgenstein applied only to 
Wittgenstein who considered himself to be Freud’s pupil, [7] and wrote about 
various aspects of psychoanalysis [8]. However, especially from the 1990s onwards, 
much has been written in research papers about the parallels between them [9]. 
However, with the passage of time there has been a change of view. In the twenty-
first century, it has become more common for researchers to discuss the contribution 
of Wittgenstein’s study of language to psychoanalytic technique, than the subject of 
Freud’s influence on Wittgenstein [10]. In this century, in which interdisciplinary 
research has become the accepted methodology, a further possible line of inquiry 
inspired by these two important thinkers can be suggested, namely: an investigation 
of the concept of uncertainty in the writings of Freud and Wittgenstein. Uncertainty 
is a major cause of difficulty in dealing with a crisis, including the crisis of Covid 19 
which has affected many aspects of people’s lives across the globe.
Freud addressed both personal and social epistemological processes in situa-
tions of crisis. Wittgenstein wrote his third book to suggest a way of coping with 
inherent uncertainty which characterizes modern thought. Ostensibly, Freud 
and Wittgenstein investigated uncertainty in entirely different contexts. Freud 
in the context of the analysis and the identification of psychic pathologies, whilst 
Wittgenstein carried out his investigation in the context of thought and the daily 
use of language. However, in both contexts, Freud and Wittgenstein examined the 
concept and sense of uncertainty, and proposed ways of coping. Similarly, we shall 
see in what follows, how Freud was aided by linguistic studies during his research 
and the ways in which Wittgenstein pointed to psychic states to shed further 
light on the philosophical content of a subject. The central argument is that there 
exists a significant common denominator in the approaches adopted by Freud and 
Wittgenstein to the subject of uncertainty. Alongside this, ideas will be presented 
that typify each of the thinkers and which characterize the uniqueness of coping 
with existential uncertainty.
2.  Types of uncertainty according to Freud and Wittgenstein: the 
common denominator
One can distinguish between two types of uncertainty shared by Freud and 
Wittgenstein. The first is existential uncertainty, which arises from a recognition of 
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a continuously changing reality and an inability prophesy the future. The second, is 
the uncertainty that exists in the pragmatic realm of psychoanalytic techniques and 
language research. This field deals with the dynamic boundaries of methodological 
concepts as well as changing aspects of interpreting reality.
I propose terming existential uncertainty “conceptual uncertainty” since it is 
derived from two facts. The first being that the world, including our own bodies, 
are in a continuous state of movement and change. Fact number two is that the 
future cannot be prophesied with any degree of certainty. All we can do is speculate 
as to what that future will be like. I suggest terming this uncertainty “methodologi-
cal uncertainty” because it arises from the nature of psychoanalytic and linguistic 
inquiry. Freud and Wittgenstein demonstrated, each in his own way and in his own 
research, that the methodological concepts they adopted are prone to a process of 
continuous change.
3. Conceptual uncertainty according to Freud
Freud formulated two kinds of existential conceptual uncertainty. The first is 
the uncertainty created because of an unforeseen eruption of human cruelty which 
undermines the ability to rely on human moral values. Freud described this in his 
article “Thoughts for the times on war and death” (1915) [11]. In this article, Freud 
dealt with “the disillusionment of the war” when, in its aftermath, he was forced to 
admit to himself that he had difficulty explaining the aggression and destructive-
ness that erupted in the course of the conflict on the part of people who shared a 
similar culture based on the values of modern humanism [12].
As a result of the total humiliation that included the world of science, people 
were left “without a glimmering of the future that is being shaped” [13]. The 
surprising depths to which humanity had sunk led to a sense of uncertainty about 
human nature itself. In retrospect, Freud offered explanations and a proposal 
to improve human future. The explanations offered by Freud with the benefit 
of hindsight, pointed to man’s primitive mind as a permanent infrastructure 
to which a person returns in certain circumstances even after gaining a higher 
“stage of development” [14]. The second explanation concerned the dependence 
of our intelligence in emotional life [15]. Meaning that emotional interest super-
sedes logical interest so that where there are emotional resistance human beings 
will act in line with the emotion of resistance rather than with wisdom. The war 
proved this to be the case at the level of nations rather than only in relation to 
individuals [16].
These two characteristics are shared by both ancient and modern man. However, 
with respect to modern man, Freud suggested the psychoanalytic description of 
the mind which sheds light on the mechanism that leads to regression as well as the 
capacity to cope with it. This, by offering an additional clarification of the nature of 
the unconscious.
According to Freud, modern man’s unconscious is problematic in three ways.
“Our unconscious is just as inaccessible to the idea of our own death, just as 
murderously inclined towards strangers, just as divided (that is, ambivalent) 
towards those we love, as was primaeval man” [17].
As was the case with primeval man, participation in war enables modern man to 
actualize his unconsciousness’s problematic inclinations and even compels him to do 
so. When war coerces a person to be a ‘hero’, it forces him to ignore the possibility of 
his death and be cruel to others. In the best psychoanalytic tradition, Freud suggests 
that modern man should deal with the repressed by creating space for thoughts 
about personal death. This would achieve two psychic gains. A recognition of reality 
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and making life bearable. Freud concluded the article by saying that “If you want to 
endure life, prepare yourself for death [18].
Thus, Freud dealt with the existential uncertainty which developed from coping 
with the First World War I, by pointing to the permanent source in a person’s psyche 
that leads human beings to be cruel to one another. The source, Freud posited, is 
the inclination to regression that remains in an individual’s psyche throughout his 
life. Uncertainty, in times of war against an enemy or a virus that spreads across 
the globe, awakens the inclination to regression. The solution proposed by Freud is 
a way of coping that characterizes the psychoanalytic world view. Awareness and 
coping with threatening and frightening subjects. It should be noted that there is 
a significant juxtaposition between the “enduring” proposed by Freud, and the 
nature of the “the depressive position” formulated by Melanie Klein. According to 
Klein, this position is the result of a fear of loss. However, it is a position that can 
also become a developmental achievement when there is an acceptance of such 
dangers as hunger and loss [19].
4. Methodological uncertainty according to Freud
The second type of conceptual uncertainty was formulated by Freud in the 
context of investigating the boundaries of analysis. Freud argued that total and 
final fulfillment of analysis cannot be reached because individual defense mecha-
nism that resist therapy cannot be discovered entirely by the therapist. In Freud’s 
view, even experienced analysts must return to analysis every few years because 
conceivably their defense mechanisms create disturbances of which they are 
unaware.
In his article “Analysis terminable and interminable (1937), Freud discussed the 
reasons why one cannot say at any point that the analysis has come to an end [20]. 
First, Freud returned to the three known conditions for terminating analysis [21]. 
One of the paper’s central subjects, which subsequently enable Freud to formulate 
his concept of Fundamental Methodological uncertainty, was the way in which 
the Ego’s defense mechanisms operate during analysis. When the patient’s defense 
mechanisms resist the exposure of the contents of the Id, the therapy becomes 
deadlocked [22]. By its very nature, the Ego resists change and the power and depth 
of this resistance to change will determine the therapy’s fate. In the case under study 
here, the defense mechanisms collide with the uncertainty embodied in the thera-
pist’s interpretations and in world events that threaten the Ego’s regular tendencies. 
Up until now we have been discussing ideas already expressed by Freud in earlier 
articles. But the novelty in this article lies in the importance that Freud attributed to 
the individuality of the defense mechanism [23].
Freud described defense mechanisms as a universal system which, in part, is 
formed culturally and socially and is, as such, inherited. However, alongside this, 
Freud stressed the individual functioning of these mechanisms which is expressed 
by a choice [unconscious of course) unique to every individual and is reflected in 
his conduct. The difficulty of researching this choice limits the therapeutic dialog 
and, at times, halts it. Moreover, sometimes the patient’s personal resistance cannot 
be in this or any other defense mechanism. Thus, in Freud’s view, the obfuscation 
that is created makes it difficult to continue the therapy. For example, at times it is 
not possible to understand the patient’s difficulty in transferring the libido from one 
object to another. Or, conversely, one cannot comprehend the ease with which the 
patient passes from one object to another.
Considering the difficult in pinpointing the form of the individual personality 
that is the foundation of defense mechanisms, Freud formulated his conclusion 
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with respect to the endlessness of analysis. He likened analysis to education and 
government and argued that “It almost looks as if analysis were the third of those 
‘impossible’ professions in which one can be sure beforehand of achieving unsatis-
fying result.” [24].
Further to this it can be argued that Freud formulated a new context of 
uncertainty with which the therapist should be reconciled. This is a conceptual 
uncertainty involved in the psychoanalytic technique: it is never possible to find 
out in detail how the individual components of the defense mechanism work. In the 
context of uncertainties caused because of the corona virus, different and varied 
ways of coping can be seen, alongside a sharp increase in requests for psychological 
help. The combination of the two types of uncertainty according to Freud sharpens 
the difficulty of observing the collective and personal behavior of human beings 
and leads to the placement of the principle of uncertainty as a key principle in 
both the analyst and the patient’s consciousness. Moreover, towards the end of his 
article on the infinity of analysis, Freud formulated an idea that makes it possible to 
reformulate the reality principle.
“we must not forget that the analytic relationship is based on a love of truth - 
that is, on a recognition of reality - and that it precludes any kind of sham or 
deceit” [25].
Meaning that, even when reality is unbearable, the pursuit of truth underlies 
psychoanalytic theory and does not allow for the disregard or distortion of reality. 
In the two articles we have discussed, it can be seen that despite Freud’s successful 
and extensive experience in the study of the mind, his love of truth was the basis 
for placing uncertainty (theoretical and technical) in a central place in human 
consciousness.
5. Conceptual uncertainty according to Wittgenstein
Though Wittgenstein was younger than Freud, he preceded him in formulating 
the notion conceptual uncertainty. In his first book, Tractatus, Wittgenstein formu-
lated the boundaries of thought and expression including the place of free will.
“The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future events cannot be 
KNOWN now. It would only be possible for us to know them if causality were an 
INNER necessity--like, say, that of logical inference.” [26].
Free Will is not dependent on facts and is even based on our inability to prophesy 
future events. From this it follows that decisions based on prophesying the future 
include inherent uncertainty. This uncertainty also exists in relation to claims of the 
recurrence of routine and permanent natural phenomena such as sunrise [27]. The 
principle is that “The world is independent of my will.” [28].
A second kind of uncertainty is described in Wittgenstein’s second book 
“Philosophical Investigations, the best known and most influential of his works. It 
was published in 1953, two years after Wittgenstein’s death.
The book’s influence spread well beyond the fields of philosophy, reaching 
all the social sciences humanities, including psychoanalysis. In it, Wittgenstein 
explores the common ways in which everyday language is used, pointing to the illu-
sions held and the mistakes made by people who attribute to grammar the possibil-
ity of creating absolute concepts or meanings that have clear boundaries.
Wittgenstein coined several methodological terms that enriched the discourse in 
various fields such as: language-games, patterns of life, rule, and depth-grammar. 
At the same time, he repeatedly returned to the idea of language’s constant dyna-
mism, including its concepts and the possibility of unambiguous interpretation. 
The paragraph in which Wittgenstein formulated the essence of his claim is Section 
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201, in which he formulated the paradox which determines the constant uncertainty 
in the use of language [29].
The central paradox formulated by Wittgenstein in the book means a particu-
lar word one cannot be said to have just one firm meaning. Even when a word is 
used in accordance with the rule, and within a concrete pattern of life, there is no 
impediment to a different application of the rule and the creation of a different 
meaning [30].
. At the end of the section, Wittgenstein re- established one of the linguistic 
turn’s significant innovations: that the meaning of a word is, in fact, the replace-
ment of a word with another, and not beyond that. That is, it is not possible to 
distinguish between a word and its meaning, but only one word can be replaced by 
another. The conclusion to be drawn from this move is that there is inherent uncer-
tainty in the use of language, and that in fact one cannot be sure of the meaning or 
permanence of a concept in our lives. In the second part of the book, Wittgenstein 
clarified the precedence that reality has over concepts. This precedence illustrates 
the possibility of changing our concepts in line with changes [31].
Even when a person believes that his propositions are correct, and that chang-
ing them would result in a missed opportunity to examine reality, he can, accord-
ing to Wittgenstein, imagine a change in the facts of nature and thus also come 
to terms with changing his concepts. The difficulty in changing ones beliefs, as 
proposed by Wittgenstein, is the basis of a fundamental question that runs like a 
second thread throughout this article: If reality changes, why is it so difficult for us 
to adapt to the fact that concepts also change? Why is there a tendency to attribute 
a physical quality to concepts, instead of seeing how they are used in a certain 
pattern of life?
In his article, “Patterns of Life: A Third Wittgenstein Concept”, Michel Ter 
Hark discusses Wittgenstein’s thoughts referred to above [32]. In answer to the 
question of how to cope with the difficulty of psychological “indeterminacy and 
uncertainty”, Ter Hark showed that there are numerous manuscripts in which one 
can find examples of Wittgenstein’s position that a concept with sharp and fixed 
boundaries cannot be created [33]. Ter Hark emphasized that part of Wittgenstein’s 
revolution lies in his attempt to understand this uncertainty of our concepts which 
arises because of ‘unharness’ and ‘indeterminacy’ not as a defect, but as.
“…revealing the structure of psychological thought itself, he has to devote 
himself to investigating the facts of human nature that shape the indeterminate 
contours of our use of psychological concepts.” [34].
It seems to me that what Wittgenstein has proposed here is a way of dealing 
with the uncertainty created by an international epidemic, or a major disaster: the 
emotional difficulty stems from the need to change the concepts to which we are 
accustomed. However, if we understand the dynamic mechanism of our concepts, 
and accept the impossibility of setting any concept in stone, it may be easier for us 
to alter our concepts and adapt them to the changes that have taken place as a result 
of the event, however difficult that may be.
6. Wittgenstein from conceptual to methodological uncertainty
“On Certainty”, Wittgenstein’s third and final book, was being written by him 
up until a few days before his death and summarizes the complexity of his world-
view. In the book, Wittgenstein formulated the nature of certainty [35] along with a 
constant awareness of the possibility of change:
“The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts 
may shift” [36].
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With the help of a comparison between a river and consciousness, Wittgenstein 
illustrated two ideas he had already presented in his book “Philosophical 
Investigations”, and which are the basis of conceptual uncertainty: language is 
dynamic, [37] and language use has already been made within the framework of 
a pattern of life that must be accepted as a given. However, his main innovation in 
his last book was that in every pattern of life there are “hinges” without which it is 
impossible to think and act:
We just cannot investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest 
content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. My 
Life consists in my being content to accept many things [38].
The use of language for the purpose of making claims must be based on assump-
tions that are beyond any doubt. For example, the assumption that a thought can 
be formulated in a language, that speakers of that language can understand these 
claims, and so on. These assumptions belong to the basic logic of language use, 
which creates a kind of confidence, and function as “hinges”. However, immediately 
after claiming the need for “hinges”, Wittgenstein made the claim that he was com-
ing to terms with many things in his life. The metaphor of the “hinges,” as Danièle 
Moyal-Sharrock put it, means that the part of the hinges on which knowledge turns, 
are not justified by the facts of nature, but “ anchored in regularities of nature” 
[39]. Wittgenstein adopts the metaphor of the “hinges”, thereby signaling a shift 
from conceptual uncertainty to methodological uncertainty: the hinges represent 
a means that make it possible in practice to use language, although the mythology 
that created them may change. Like the paradox of rules, presented above from 
“Philosophical Investigations”, the hinges also function paradoxically as a means, 
on the one hand of achieving stability, and, on the other hand as a means that 
can change.
The conclusion so far from the discussion of uncertainty in both Freud and 
Wittgenstein’s writings has been that it exists on the conceptual as well as on the 
methodological level. Uncertainty on both levels has been described as an integral 
part of the nature of language and thought.
7.  Freud and Wittgenstein on chaos and complexity and its relation to 
uncertainty
Further to this conclusion, it is worth examining the similarities between 
conceptual and methodological uncertainty inspired by Freud and Wittgenstein, as 
well as theories of chaos and complexity from the 1980s onwards. On the one hand, 
it would appear that the seeds of theories of chaos and complexity already exist in 
Freud’s and Wittgenstein’s writings. Wittgenstein described language and thought 
in terms of complexity, and Freud used the term ‘chaos’ in two main contexts. On 
the other hand, neither of them conceptualized chaos nor complexity as compo-
nents of the same range, that are usually considered in these theories. Therefore it 
is firstly necessary to clarify the principal part of theories of chaos and complexity 
so as to conceptualize Freud’s and Wittgenstein’s concepts of uncertainty. Secondly, 
I will summarize Freud and Wittgenstein’s contribution to notions of chaos and 
complexity. Thirdly, to emphasis the novelty of this article, it will suggest Freud and 
Wittgenstein’s contribution to coping with a sudden and unexpected event, while 
filling the existing lacuna in chaos and complexity theories.
The term “complexity” can be attributed to the revolution described by Thomas 
Kuhn in his influential book: The Structure of Scientific Revolution [40]. Influenced 
by Wittgenstein who resisted the possibility of a final and complete definition 
of any concept [41]. Kuhn coined the term “paradigm” to express the view that 
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scientific theories are not bound to any a priory order. The position adopted by 
Kuhn, is compatible with the main-stream definition of complexity:
“complexity is the awareness that nothing can be included in an exhaustive defi-
nition, as the possible observation vertexes of a single phenomenon are potentially 
infinite. There are no pontifical meta-psychological models” [42].
Complexity is a scientific theory that reflects the acceptance of the impossibility 
of limiting and defining any phenomenon, as well as an understanding that there 
is no theory that can completely unite or clarify all the experiences of a particular 
concept. Thus, this position leads to an epistemological change in the worldview, 
which becomes based on inherent uncertainty:
“Irreversibility and non- linearity of processes originates diversification, beauty 
and the complexity of the natural world, constituting the creative dynamics of very 
different systems: from biochemistry to meteorology, from cosmology to psychol-
ogy. […] All this involves a radical epistemological change which makes us 
observe the world in terms of uncertainty, and of the ephemeral but at the same 
time creative self- organization which discovers time as fundamental concept to the 
comprehension of the evolutive process” [43].
Uncertainty stems from the nature of processes in all aspects of life, nature, 
human society, and works of art. In each of the areas, the theory of complexity 
reveals diversity and dynamism that lead to a conceptual change accepting uncer-
tainty as a starting-point of any scientific clarification. This kind of uncertainty, 
both conceptual and methodological, is also the ground [basis?] for a renewed 
concept of chaos.
The concept “chaos” (Chàos) originated in Greek philosophy, meaning a shape-
less and disorderly situation that preceded the existence of the world. From the days 
of Greek philosophy and throughout Western thought, this concept was discussed 
in different contexts. From the 1980s, new, interdisciplinary theories developed 
a new scientific attitude emphasizing the chaos’s nature[quality?] of complexity, 
instead of its formlessness and disorder. In this spirit, Nicoletta Sala described the 
relationship between the two concepts as a possible point of view[perspective?] for 
examining any kind of system.
“Complexity can occur in natural and man-made systems, as well as in social 
structures and human beings. […] A complex system is neither completely deter-
ministic nor completely random and it exhibits both characteristics. […] The 
complexity is the most difficult area of chaos, and it describes the complex 
motion and the dynamics of sensitive systems. The chaos reveals a hidden fractal 
order underlying all seemingly chaotic events” [44].
This description clearly illustrates the combination of the structural and post-
structural aspects of theories of chaos and complexity. The way chaos is defined, as 
the hidden-ordered basis of the complex organization of each system, challenges 
the possibility of unexpected events. Although an event like the Covid-19 pandemic 
can be explained retrospectively, from a psychic perspective, this explanation is 
insufficient.
The study of psychoanalysis from the late 1980s welcomed theories of chaos 
and complexity [45]. The basis for this lies in Freud’s writings, in his description of 
the dream and the unconscious, as well as the nature of impulse [46]. Freud was 
unaware that he was ahead of his time, but it must be possible to find both concepts 
of chaos and complexity in the infrastructure of his thinking. Freud’s contribution 
to our discussion is to show that it is impossible to create direct access from the id 
and from the unconscious to the conscious and ordinary language.
Rather than using the term “chaos”, Wittgenstein used the adjective “complex” 
when describing the action of language. The main cause of this complexity, in 
Wittgenstein’s view is that “Language disguises thought”, and therefore mistakes 
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and disruptions are created in the use of language (which create methodological 
uncertainties). The key to solving this is in social agreements how to use the lan-
guage correctly:
“Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every 
sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning 
is. […] Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less com-
plicated than it. […] Language disguises thought. […] The tacit conventions on 
which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously compli-
cated” [47].
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein already presented the complexity of language 
as well as the complexity of the conventions of everyday language. Two separate 
levels of consciousness participate in the mechanism of creating sense: the universal 
grammar, independent of human influence and decision, and social agreements, 
independent of individual choice. Nevertheless, we use language instinctively, 
being unaware not only of its complexity, but also of the gap between its “outward 
form” and our thought. In this manner, Wittgenstein initiated the wave of theories 
of complexity concerning the relationships between language and thought.
These two distinctions, about the complexity of language and the importance of 
consent, also appear as key arguments in Wittgenstein’s late thinking:
“It is not only agreement in definitions, but also (odd as it may sound) agree-
ment in judgements that is required for communication by means of language. This 
seems to abolish logic but does not do so” [48].
Just as Wittgenstein emphasized the importance of social agreements in his early 
and later work, so he also pointed to the logical basis of grammar, which allows for a 
ratio of pictoriality between language and the world:
“The agreement, the harmony, between thought and reality consists in this: that 
if I say falsely that something is red, then all the same, it is red that it isn’t.” [49].
Llanguage can be used in a false way, but Wittgenstein claimed a statement that 
is not obvious in the postmodern era: there may be a correlation between the use 
of language and facts in the world. Naturally, there may be a discrepancy as we saw 
above. However, it is key to the understanding not only of ordinary use of language, 
but also of a sudden crisis. In conclusion, Freud and Wittgenstein’s joint contribu-
tion to contemporary theories of chaos and complexity lies in their presentation the 
mental system as one of complexity that stems from the difficulty of bridging the 
gap between two types of consciousness: the unconscious way in which we dream, 
and even use language, which creates mistakes and disagreements (in which there 
is a chaotic dimension). Conversely, when consent is reached language can be used 
effectively, and human suffering becomes easier to bear.
However, this uncertainty is part of a proper examination of reality, and it does 
not involve dealing with a surprising change that cannot be predicted. Thus, in the 
final stage of the article, I would like to offer a discussion of uncertainty embodied 
in the concept of The Uncanny which expresses an experience of sudden and 
unexpected uncertainty. Freud Wittgenstein both related to the concept of The 
Uncanny, its clarification with their help may assist in coping with the experience.
8.  The Uncanny as methodological uncertainty according to Freud and 
Wittgenstein
If, inspired by Wittgenstein, we relate to a pattern of life as a given in the frame-
work of which certainty exists, then if the form of life radically changes, as it did 
during the Covid 19 pandemic, that certainty is also undermined. Such a situation 
not only exposes the relativity of certainty, since it is dependent on the permanence 
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of the pattern of life, but also creates an experience of ambivalence: on the one 
hand, patterns of life such as the daily routine, the division of time between work 
and home, are disturbed. Added to that, are worries about one’s health and liveli-
hood. These create an experience of ambiguousness and anxiety. On the other hand, 
there remain hinges from the previous form of life, whose reality creates difficulty 
in verbalizing reality and defining its nature.
In their writings, Freud and Wittgenstein tried to discover how psychic experi-
ences that cause distress are verbalized. Each of them also wondered in their own 
way, how a person gets caught up in an experience of ambiguousness and the 
difficulty he has in verbalizing what he feels. Wittgenstein’s assertion that interpre-
tation involves the substitution of one word by another, facilitates the substitution 
of ‘uncertainty’ by ‘The Uncanny’, a concept shared by Freud and Wittgenstein, and 
one which may be helpful in shedding light on the experience. Both were interested 
in this experience in the context of daily life, and which is also highly relevant to 
the period in which we now live, when the pandemic caused by Covid 19 is phe-
nomenon that can be monitored both empirically and rationally. In what follows, 
I will show that although in his 1919 article which he devoted to the subject of the 
Uncanny [50]. Freud focused on the aspects involved in the creation of literature, 
he also sought to link his conclusions to the actual reality rather than limiting it to 
the realm of literary research.
Inspired by Freud’s article, Nicholas Royle [51], devoted an entire book to 
an interdisciplinary discussion of the concept, and in another book in which he 
discusses the concept in the context of literary research, he concluded that:
“The uncanny can be described as the thoughts and feelings which may arise on 
those occasions when the homely becomes unhomely, when the familiar becomes 
unfamiliar or the unfamiliar becomes strangely familiar. Alternatively, the uncanny 
is […] – that which ‘ought to have remained... secret and hidden but has come to 
light” [52].
The uncanny, as being a confusion between the familiar and the unfamiliar, and 
as something that should remain hidden, is appropriate for the construction of a 
literary text, especially a detective or horror story. However, this definition leaves 
the uncanny as a literary ploy but does not allude to its cause, nor does it include any 
guidance as to how one deals with the experience. On the other hand, Freud in his 
discussion of the concept, offered his opinion on the ‘before’ and ‘after’ encounter 
with the uncanny.
In the first place it should be noted that Freud used this title throughout his 
writings, and not just in an article devoted to its discussion. For example, in his 
book “Dream Interpretation”, Freud often mentions a sense of uncertainty in the 
context of dream interpretation. Uncertainty can arise because of partial recollec-
tion of the components of the dream, the patient’s disagreement with the interpre-
tation offered by the analyst, and because of difficulty in creating an integration 
between the dream’s components. To connect dream-thoughts to construct a 
dream-situation, Freud proposed a technique that dispels uncertainty:
“In analyzing a dream, if an uncertainty can be resolved into an ‘either-or’, we 
must replace it for purposes of interpretation by an ‘and’ and take each of the appar-
ent alternatives as an independent starting-point for a series of associations” [53].
Freud proposed a grammatical guideline for solving the interpretive complica-
tion, and even adopted, as did Wittgenstein. To this end Freud suggested replacing a 
dichotomous interpretation with an interpretation that contain two starting points. 
Namely, it leads to a softening of the perception of reality and of its sense of finality.
Freud also used this concept in the context of ‘omnipotence of thoughts’, 
a phrase suggested to Freud by one of his patients, who tended to attribute 
magical power to his thoughts [54]. In the same context, Freud noted that we 
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sometimes attribute an “‘uncanny’ quality” even when we are able to use our 
rational judgment [55].
This sense of independence of thought is also at the heart of Freud’s article on 
the threatened. Freud disagreed with Jentsch, the psychiatrist who preceded him 
and wrote an essay on the threatened. Jentsch focused on the threatened as intel-
lectual uncertainty and Freud disagreed with him [56]. Freud suggested focusing 
on two key components of the experience: doubleness and a compulsion to repeat. 
“Intellectual uncertainty,” [57] according to Freud, means that a person sees some-
thing or someone and is unable to identify it or them. This uncertainty, in Jentsch’s 
view, originates in the cognitive system which is why he termed it thus. Freud, 
however, disagreed with him, arguing that it was a different kind of uncertainty 
that originates in the defense mechanism which hides early and primary anxiety 
stemming from castration anxiety in childhood. In the framework of the mental 
process of protection, a person sees a different image, that conceals the original 
nature of anxiety. In this instance, Freud described the link between repressed 
anxiety and the uncanny as a symbolic connection and argued that there is no 
necessary connection between the nature of anxiety and the nature of the uncanny, 
but that the repressed anxiety constitutes the uncanny [58]. Which is to say, that 
repressed anxiety turns any given state into the uncanny. In another case, when a 
person encounters the “secret nature of the uncanny”, there is no symbolic copy, but 
only something familiar that seems Unheimlich:
“this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar 
and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only 
through the process of repression” [59].
Freud expanded the understanding of the threatened beyond its function as a 
literary ploy, to incorporate an experience indicative of early anxiety. In our case, it 
can be inferred that the greater the pool of repressed anxieties in the mind, so the 
uncertainty that arises because of an external event will create an uncanny experi-
ence. Could an uncanny experience be related to a mechanism other than repressed 
anxiety that is transformed into the uncanny, or anxiety that arises and creates a 
sense of being thrown out of home?
Wittgenstein suggested another aspect of the uncanny experience:
“But can’t I imagine that people around me are automata, lack consciousness, 
even though they behave in the same way as usual? [...] the idea is perhaps a little 
uncanny. But just try to hang on to this idea during your ordinary intercourse with 
others - in the street, say! Say to yourself, for example: “The children over there 
are mere automata; all their liveliness is mere automatism.” And you will either 
find these words becoming quite empty; or you will produce in yourself uncanny 
feeling” [60].
The only section in Wittgenstein’s book “Philosophical Investigations” in 
which he discusses the experience of the uncanny, depicts a combined experi-
ence of uncertainty and the uncanny. Wittgenstein describes a situation in which 
a person experiences human he observes as laborers working mechanically and 
automatically. That is, he fails to make the analogy between himself and them, and 
to attribute to them an inner world, feelings, and thoughts, but only actions that 
appear to be inhuman. Although many scholars have discussed the uncertainty in 
Wittgenstein’s writings regarding what is happening to an-other, the above cita-
tion shows the opposite: the (temporary, apparently) inability to see the individual 
humanity, and the vision of another person as an automaton, creates in the observer 
an experience of uncanniness. Moreover, in this section, Wittgenstein goes beyond 
the routine boundaries of certainty within a pattern of life and focuses on an 
experience that can be universal, a sense of alienation that creates discomfort. One 
can combine Freud and Wittgenstein’s thoughts about the uncanny and argue that 
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this experience stems from an outburst of repressed anxiety which creates a sense 
of loneliness, strangeness and alienation, and a difficulty in seeing vitality and 
humanity in other human beings.
9. Conclusion
The discussion of Freud and Wittgenstein’s concept of uncertainty revealed two 
main types of uncertainty which are intermittently activated in their investigations 
in key contexts. The central argument, that uncertainty is in- built into the rec-
ognition of a constant process of change (of the world, of language, and of self-
awareness), leads to a deeper understanding of psychoanalytic methodology and of 
language research, both of which include concepts that cannot be defined conclu-
sively. Additionally, during a significant traumatic event, the ability to contain, bear 
and come to terms with constant uncertainty is undermined, creating an experience 
of uncanniness. This experience transcends the constant acceptance of uncertainty, 
in which repressed anxieties are released, and the ability to feel empathy and see the 
humanity in other humans is impaired. Dealing with outbursts of anxiety can be 
ameliorated with the help of the philosophical-psychoanalytic examination pro-
posed above, by the possibility of action based on the hinges, which human beings 
can examine and re-establish, and with the aid of free will based on exactly the 
same uncertainty pointed to by Freud and Wittgenstein.
© 2021 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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